A non-cooperative approach to the folk rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems
NAGIOS: RODERIC FUNCIONANDO

A non-cooperative approach to the folk rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems

DSpace Repository

IMPORTANT: El repositori està en manteniment des del dia 28 de Novembre fins al 3 de Desembre, només es pot consultar, però no afegir contingut. Disculpeu les molèsties

A non-cooperative approach to the folk rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems

Show full item record

View       (774.3Kb)

   
    
Hernández, Penélope; Peris, Josep E.; Vidal Puga, Juan
This document is a artículoDate2023

This paper deals with the problem of finding a way to distribute the cost of a minimum cost spanning tree problem between the players. A rule that assigns a payoff to each player provides this distribution. An optimistic point of view is considered to devise a cooperative game. Following this optimistic approach, a sequential game provides this construction to define the action sets of the players. The main result states the existence of a unique cost allocation in subgame perfect equilibria. This cost allocation matches the one suggested by the folk rule.
Ver en el catálogo Trobes

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show full item record

Search DSpace

Advanced Search

Browse

Statistics