Recursive and bargaining values

Recursive and bargaining values

DSpace Repository

Recursive and bargaining values

Show simple item record Calvo, Emilio Gutiérrez-López, Esther 2022-05-19T17:52:31Z 2022-05-19T17:52:31Z 2021
dc.description.abstract We introduce two families of values for TU-games: the recursive and bargaining values. Bargaining values are obtained as the equilibrium payoffs of the symmetric non-cooperative bargaining game proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996). We show that bargaining values have a recursive structure in their definition, and we call this property recursiveness. All efficient, linear, and symmetric values that satisfy recursiveness are called recursive values. We generalize the notions of potential, and balanced contributions property, to characterize the family of recursive values. Finally, we show that if a time discount factor is considered in the bargaining model, every bargaining value has its corresponding discounted bargaining value.
dc.language.iso eng
dc.relation.ispartof Mathematical Social Sciences, 2021, vol. 113, p. 97-106
dc.source Calvo, Emilio Gutiérrez-López, Esther 2021 Recursive and bargaining values Mathematical Social Sciences 113 97 106
dc.subject Economia Mètodes estadístics
dc.subject Economia social
dc.subject Matemàtica financera
dc.subject Sociologia matemàtica
dc.title Recursive and bargaining values
dc.type journal article es_ES 2022-05-19T17:52:31Z
dc.identifier.idgrec 148304
dc.rights.accessRights open access es_ES

View       (540.3Kb)

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record

Search DSpace

Advanced Search