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Recursive and bargaining values

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Recursive and bargaining values

dc.contributor.author	Calvo, Emilio
dc.contributor.author	Gutiérrez-López, Esther
dc.date.accessioned	2022-05-19T17:52:31Z
dc.date.available	2022-05-19T17:52:31Z
dc.date.issued	2021
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/10550/82900
dc.description.abstract	We introduce two families of values for TU-games: the recursive and bargaining values. Bargaining values are obtained as the equilibrium payoffs of the symmetric non-cooperative bargaining game proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996). We show that bargaining values have a recursive structure in their definition, and we call this property recursiveness. All efficient, linear, and symmetric values that satisfy recursiveness are called recursive values. We generalize the notions of potential, and balanced contributions property, to characterize the family of recursive values. Finally, we show that if a time discount factor is considered in the bargaining model, every bargaining value has its corresponding discounted bargaining value.
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation.ispartof	Mathematical Social Sciences, 2021, vol. 113, p. 97-106
dc.source	Calvo, Emilio Gutiérrez-López, Esther 2021 Recursive and bargaining values Mathematical Social Sciences 113 97 106
dc.subject	Economia Mètodes estadístics
dc.subject	Economia social
dc.subject	Matemàtica financera
dc.subject	Sociologia matemàtica
dc.title	Recursive and bargaining values
dc.type	journal article	es_ES
dc.date.updated	2022-05-19T17:52:31Z
dc.identifier.doi	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.05.004
dc.identifier.idgrec	148304
dc.rights.accessRights	open access	es_ES